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Abstract 
Several tradable performance standard (TPS) programs have recently been 
implemented in the US transportation sector: regulations for greenhouse gas 
emissions from passenger cars and trucks (national), zero-emission vehicle programs 
(10 states), the Renewable Fuel Standard (national), and low-carbon fuel standards 
(two states). The primary motivations are to promote innovation, to address 
consumers’ undervaluation of efficiency, and to reduce externalities, such as air 
pollution and the risks of dependence on foreign oil. A TPS sets a standard of 
technology performance but leaves technology choice to the producers; it increases 
the relative costs of technologies with undesirable performance characteristics and 
lowers the costs of technologies with desirable characteristics. We review the TPS 
programs and compare TPS with carbon pricing. Whereas carbon pricing creates 
incentives for both output reduction and technology change, TPS programs do not 
fully internalize the costs of emissions, resulting in lower price effects on products and 
raising the total cost of emissions reductions compared with carbon pricing. However, 
a TPS provides stronger incentives for upstream innovation and technology 
transformation. We show that TPS programs are generally additive to the effects of 
carbon pricing, so the policies can be combined without sacrificing the efficiency 
properties achieved by pricing. Given that the expected carbon price may be too low 
to substantially affect transportation demand or technology change, combining TPS 
with a carbon price may be necessary to drive innovation and achieve a sustained low-
carbon transformation in the sector.  
Keywords: policy instruments, transportation, performance-based standard, 
innovation, mitigation cost, complementary policy 
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1. Introduction 
Performance standards have a long history in the US transportation sector, beginning 
at the national level with the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards 
enacted by Congress in 1975 (Greene 1990), and in California with the Zero Emission 
Vehicle (ZEV) program adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) in 1990 
(Collantes and Sperling 2008). Unlike technology mandates, which prescribe specific 
technology (e.g., a three-way catalytic converter), performance standards set a goal 
(e.g., maximum emissions per unit of performance, or vehicle efficiency of at least x 
miles per gallon), enabling the regulated entity to choose any technology mix that 
achieves that outcome (Bergek and Berggren 2014). Performance standards can force 
technology innovation by specifying a standard that cannot be met with conventional 
technology (Lee et al. 2010) or that imposes higher cost (Gerard and Lave 2005). 
When implemented as technology volume requirements (e.g., requiring that products 
with a specific technology constitute x percentage of all new sales), performance 
standards push an identified technology into the market, usually with the intent of 
achieving cost reductions through market penetration. When implemented as an 
emissions intensity standard, performance standards provide flexibility by enabling 
compliance through incremental improvements without specifying technology choice. 
Tradability or averaging of performance across facilities introduces additional 
flexibility and thus improves the cost-effectiveness of the policy.  
TPS programs have been prominent in the US electricity sector, exemplified in 29 
states’ renewable portfolio standards and in the Obama administration’s proposed 
Clean Power Plan. Recently, China announced its intent to implement the largest rate-
based emissions trading program in the world in its electricity sector (Goulder and 
Morgenstern 2018). Some incentive-based regulatory programs address the 
transportation sector. In the bonus-malus (Latin for good-bad, here meaning credit-
tax) system in France, consumers receive a rebate for low-emission vehicles but pay a 
fee for higher-emission vehicles. The European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive 
mandates that clean sources account for minimum shares of the energy consumed in 
road and rail transport in member countries.  
Very few programs in the transportation sector, however, allow companies to trade 
credits for compliance.1 The most prominent examples have been in the United States: 
the national regulations for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from passenger cars and 
trucks (introduced in 2009, with first trading in 2012), zero-emission vehicle programs 
in 10 states (first adoption in 1990, first trading in 2012), the national Renewable Fuel 
 
1 Sweden, for example, has a program for increasing biofuel content of diesel and gasoline 
called Reduktionsplikten. Each year the fuel producers must achieve a certain percentage of 
biofuel. These obligations are tradable, making this technically a TPS, although there has little 
discussion of this aspect. 
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Standard (introduced in 2005, first trading in 2010), and California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standards (adopted in 2010, first trading in 2011).  
Earlier attention to performance standards focused on their ability to promote 
innovation (Nentjes et al. 2007; Bergek and Berggren 2014; Klier and Linn 2016) and to 
address imperfect competition, consumers’ undervaluation of energy efficiency 
(Greene 2019; Fischer 2010), consumers’ inelasticity to fuel price changes (Hughes et 
al. 2008; Lin and Prince 2013), and externalities such as air pollution and the risks of 
dependence on foreign sources of oil (Lin and Prince 2009; Schnepf and Yacobucci 
2013). In the absence of federal leadership in implementing ambitious carbon pricing, 
attention has shifted to the cost-effectiveness of TPS compared with carbon pricing 
(Nentjes and Woerdman 2012). It is often argued that without comprehensive, global 
carbon pricing, TPS programs must increasingly be part of emissions reduction 
policies if we are to control the total carbon concentration in the atmosphere (Sperling 
and Nichols 2012). 
Broadly speaking, pollution can be abated either through changes in technology 
(inputs and production technologies) or through reduced consumption of the goods 
that embed emissions. Abatement of emissions through changes in technology is the 
main objective of TPS programs. In contrast, a price on carbon emissions provides 
incentives to change both technology (input substitution and abatement effects) and 
consumption levels or technology (the output effect) (Goulder et al. 1999). Emissions 
pricing puts an equal value on emissions reductions throughout the value chain; this 
generally means that it is the most efficient policy (Sterner 2007). 
TPS programs are more common than carbon pricing in the US transportation sector, 
for several reasons. The sector has some of the highest GHG mitigation costs of 
developed countries’ economies (IPCC 2014; Creutzig et al. 2015; Yeh et al. 2017; 
Gillingham and Stock 2018), and therefore either very high fuel taxes or separate 
policy instruments other than carbon pricing are needed to achieve GHG reduction 
goals. Even with high fuel taxes in Europe, for example, emissions reduction targets 
still face significant challenges. Fuel tax increases have provoked strong backlashes, 
such as the “yellow vests” movement in France. In contrast, both politically and 
economically, the production subsidy to desired technologies implicit in the TPS 
approach (explained below) drives technological change while reducing the visible 
costs to consumers, compared with achieving the same outcome with carbon pricing. 
Nonmarket-based policy instruments such as regulations, technology mandates, and 
standards focus directly on technology change, but they may result in substantial 
differences in marginal abatement costs even within the same industry. Tradable 
standards are more economically efficient because they allow for equalization of 
marginal costs across technologies and firms. But unlike emissions pricing, they do 
not have an output effect: consumers do not bear the full cost of the pollution and do 
not have incentive to reduce consumption of polluting products.  
Our paper begins by evaluating TPS programs, focusing on real-world implementation 
of two national programs and two state-level programs as they have been 
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implemented in California (Section 2). We then compare TPS and carbon pricing 
approaches in terms of their formulations and price effects (Section 3) and the 
mitigation costs at the program and system levels (Section 4). We look specifically at 
the policies’ effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions but ignore other important 
aspects, such as equity effects, that are reviewed elsewhere. In Section 5 we 
summarize the lessons learned and offer recommendations. 
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2. Review of Notable Programs 
A performance standard can target performance (e.g., sales of electric vehicles, 
vehicle efficiency in miles per gallon) or emissions intensity (e.g., carbon intensity of 
fuels, emissions intensity of vehicles). The requirements typically become more 
stringent over time, often leading to higher credit prices and incentives to innovate. 
Compliance requirements can be placed upstream (on producers or suppliers) or 
downstream (on consumers). Often, the point of regulation is placed as far upstream 
as possible to reduce the regulatory burden for administration, reporting, and 
monitoring. Small producers below a certain threshold are frequently exempted. 
TPS compliance options typically include (1) producing products that meet or exceed 
the standard, thereby generating credits that can be sold to other producers; (2) 
purchasing surplus credits from other producers; and (3) using banked credits or 
credits borrowed against future credits (if allowed). Monitoring, verification, and 
enforcement requirements are similar to those in other environmental markets, with 
the noncompliance penalty becoming the de facto ceiling for the credit price. If there 
is a cap on credit prices that is lower than the marginal compliance cost, then the 
standard will not be met (Greenstone and Nath 2019). 
Most of the credit trading programs in the transportation sector are not large enough 
to support public trading platforms. Instead, trading takes place bilaterally, between 
companies. Reporting of credit prices may or may not be mandatory but reporting the 
number of credits sold or bought and the credit balance at the end of the compliance 
period is always mandatory. Credit prices that are not reported can sometimes be 
calculated from companies’ annual financial reports. Some commodity trading 
companies that specialize in these markets also report credit prices as part of the 
market reports for current and potential clients. 
Table 1 summarizes the major TPS programs in the US transportation sector. Two 
programs (regulations for GHG emissions from passenger cars and trucks; and zero-
emission vehicles, ZEV) address vehicles. The other two (Renewable Fuel Standard, 
RFS; and low-carbon fuel standards, LCFS) address fuels. GHG regulations and LCFS 
are intensity standards, regulating the average emissions intensity of vehicles and 
fuels, respectively, whereas ZEV and RFS mandates are based on sales volumes, which 
makes them effectively intensity standards as well. ZEV, RFS, and LCFS all seek to 
push new, cleaner technology into the markets, whereas GHG regulations for cars and 
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Table 1. Selected Tradable Performance Standards in US Transportation Sector  
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* Programs started as technology mandates or standards and incorporated credit trading later. 
2.1. Regulations for Passenger Vehicle GHG Emissions 
The US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations for light-duty vehicles 
were enacted by Congress in 1975 and implemented by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1978. The 1975 law established separate sales-
weighted average miles per gallon standards for passenger cars and light trucks and 
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required each manufacturer’s new-vehicle fleets to meet the relevant standard.2 The 
standards for cars have required somewhat greater relative increases than those for 
trucks (US EPA 2020). Within their own regulated fleets, manufacturers could bank 
credits and borrow against future credits, but credit trading between manufacturers 
was not allowed. In 2007, Congress amended the law to allow credit trading. It also 
required that a manufacturer’s standard be indexed to the size of the vehicles it 
produced, as measured by their “footprints.”3 That year, the US Supreme Court ruled 
that GHGs were a pollutant as defined under the US Clean Air Act, a decision that 
affirmed the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate 
motor vehicle GHG emissions. NHTSA, EPA, and the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB) jointly implemented coordinated fuel economy and GHG emissions standards 
for model years 2012 through 2025.4   
When fuel economy or GHG standards are binding, they impose shadow prices on 
inefficient, higher-emitting vehicles in proportion to their deviation from the standard 
but subsidize fuel-efficient, low-GHG vehicles (Davis and Knittel 2019). In the case of 
the footprint standard, the shadow pricing is relative to the target for a vehicle of a 
given type and size (Liu and Greene 2014). Before trading between firms was allowed, 
shadow prices exhibited substantial heterogeneity across manufacturers because of 
differences in their market segments and their access to fuel-efficient technology 
(Jacobsen 2013; Anderson and Sallee 2011). This heterogeneity should incentivize 
between-firm trading. One analysis estimated that full trading across vehicle classes 
and between manufacturers could reduce the compliance costs of a 40 percent 
increase in fuel economy from 2012 to 2020 by more than 10 percent (Rubin et al. 
2009). A small reduction in the benefits of trading, however, might result from 
oligopoly and oligopsony in credit markets. Another reason the full potential of trading 
might not be realized is that manufacturers may choose to pay fines if the cost of 
meeting the standards exceeds the fine.  
Before footprint standards and credit trading, manufacturers of luxury imported 
vehicles, including Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Porsche, Volvo, Daimler Chrysler, and 
Jaguar Land Rover, accumulated more than $870 million in fines (nominal value) 
between 1983 and 2012 (Figure 1). Some companies—Fiat Chrysler, Jaguar Land 
Rover, and Volvo—continued to pay fines after 2012, when trading became available, 
but the number of companies paying fines fell significantly. The fines translate to less 
than $100 per vehicle except for luxury brands, such as Jaguar Land Rover ($200 per 
vehicle) and Ferrari Maserati, Saleen, and Spyker ($600 per vehicle).  
 
 
2 The standard defines average as the harmonic mean of miles per gallon, which is equivalent 
to the mean of gallons per mile. 
3 A vehicle’s footprint is defined as the average of its front and rear axle track width multiplied 
by its wheelbase. 
4 The Trump administration revoked California’s authority to regulated GHG emissions in 2019. 
The validity of the revocation is currently being litigated. 
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 Summary of CAFE Fines, by Manufacturer, 1982–2017 
Notes: Sales production volume data are available only for 2004–2018 (US EPA 2020). GHG 
credit trading started in 2012. Also shown are the estimated annual fines in dollars per vehicle 
($/veh) by company (2004–2017). Smaller companies are omitted. Source: NHTSA (2020). 
During 2008–2015, the initial years of CAFE and GHG credit trading, nearly all firms 
were accumulating credits, and trades were very infrequent (Figure 2), suggesting 
that the standards were likely nonbinding or that firms were expecting compliance 
costs to rise (Bialek and Shrader 2019). Of the credits earned from 2012 to 2018, three 
firms (Honda, Tesla, and Toyota) accounted for 69 percent. The same three firms 
supplied 94 percent of the credits sold in 2018 (Figure 2). 
 GHG Credits, Deficits, Purchases, and Sales, by Manufacturer, 2009–2018 
Notes: (a) Total EPA GHG credits (+) and deficits (–) by company, 2009–2018. 2009–2011 are early crediting years. For 
example, Fiat Chrysler (FCA) accumulated deficits and also purchased credits for compliance whereas Toyota accumulated 
net credits and sold some credits. Smaller companies are omitted. Source: US EPA (2020). (b) Light-duty vehicle GHG 
emission credit sales (<0) and purchases (>0) by manufacturer by model year. Manufacturers not shown sold or purchased 
few or no credits during the 2012–2018 period.  
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Because buyers and sellers arrange sales bilaterally, the program lacks transparency: 
the quantity of trades and prices, as well as possible side agreements, are not reported. 
Bialek and Shrader (2019) used banking behavior in CAFE to identify expectations of 
marginal abatement costs. Leard and McConnell (2017), using Tesla’s 2020 Form 10-k 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the sales of GHG credits, 
as well as the settlement between EPA and Hyundai and Kia for violating the standard, 
estimated credit prices at $36–$63/Mg (Table 2). Our own estimates using Tesla’s filing 
data yielded lower estimates of $10–$18/Mg for 2017 and 2018 (see the following section). 
Table 2. GHG Credit Prices ($/Mg), 2012–2018 
Source 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Leard and McConnell (2017) $36 $63 $42 — — — — 
Authors’ estimates* $36 $62 $63 $42 — $10 $18 
* Authors’ estimates are based on US EPA (2020) and Tesla’s annual financial reports. 
2.2. Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Programs 
The California Air Resources Board first adopted the ZEV requirement in 1990. 
Currently there are nine states that have adopted California’s ZEV regulations: 
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode 
Island and Vermont. Auto manufacturers are required to produce a certain number of 
ZEVs and plug-in hybrids each year, determined as a percentage of their total 
California sales. The percentage was 4.5 percent in 2018 and rises to 22 percent by 
2025. Each vehicle receives one to four credits, based on its electric driving range. The 
more electric range a vehicle has, the more credits it receives. Auto manufacturers can 
also purchase credits to achieve compliance and bank credits for future use. 
Manufacturers must comply at the end of each compliance period and can carry 
excess credits over to the next period. 
The numerous ZEV credit categories and calculations reflect the several kinds of low-
emission vehicles available: full battery-electric vehicles (BEVs), hydrogen fuel-cell 
vehicles, plug-in hybrid-electric transitional vehicles (TZEVs), partial ZEVs (PZEVs), and 
advanced technology (AT) PZEVs. Prior to 2015, the credit unit was called nonmethane 
organic gas mass emission (grams per mile), which was simplified to ZEV credits after 
2015. Figure 3(a) shows ZEV credit trades for 2012–2018. Tesla has generated the most 
credits by far for sale to the other car companies (68 percent); Toyota is second (10 
percent).5 Toyota also bought the most credits (32 percent), followed by Fiat/Chrysler 
(16 percent), Honda (13 percent), and Ford (11 percent). 
 
5 Note that before 2015, Toyota sold only AT PZEV (clean hybrids), essentially discounted ZEV, credits. 
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 California ZEV Credits, Deficits, and Credit Balances, by Manufacturer 
Notes: (a) Total ZEV credits bought (–) and sold (+) by manufacturer, 2012–2018. Credits from 2012–2014 were divided by 
0.035 to convert grams/mile nonmethane organic gas credits to ZEV credits. (b) ZEV credit balances as of August 31, 2018. 
Smaller companies are omitted. Source: CARB (2020b).Like other transportation sector TPS programs, the market for the 
ZEV program is closed (i.e., trading is allowed only among regulated parties), and credits are transferred directly between 
two companies or through other arrangements, without going through a public marketplace. Credit transactions must be 
reported, but not credit prices. In 2016 Tesla sold ZEV credits to Toyota and in 2017 to Toyota, Fiat Chrysler, and Subaru, and 
in 2017 and 2018 Fiat Chrysler sold ZEV credits to Honda. Companies also bank a significant amount of credits for future use 
or sales. On August 31, 2018, for example, Toyota held about as many ZEV credits in the bank as the total credits sold by 
Tesla in all previous years (Figure 3(b)). 
ZEV credit sales have provided crucial financial support for Tesla, especially in the early 
years of the program. In general, Tesla vehicles earn about four ZEV credits per BEV 
sold, depending on the model (Forbes 2017). Credit sales constituted 135 percent6 of 
Tesla’s gross profit (or about $17,000 per vehicle across all models) in 2012; the value 
decreased to 15 percent (or about $2,550 per vehicle across all models) in 2019 (Figure 
4(b)). Overall, Tesla sold more than $1.05 billion in ZEV credits in 2009–2019, according 
to its SEC filings. Each ZEV credit could theoretically be worth up to $5,000 (the fine for 
noncompliance), although the market value is typically far less. Tesla’s ZEV credit sales 
are estimated at around $1,000–$4,200 per ZEV credit except for 2013, when the value 
is estimated to have been close to $7,000 per ZEV credit. In 2013, Tesla realized 
approximately $28,000 in ZEV credit value on each sale of Model S (priced at $70,000 
to $100,000 per vehicle). In addition to ZEV credit sales, Tesla also benefited from GHG 
credit sales (see Section 3.2), reported at $315 million in 2018 (Figure 4(a)). 
 
6 This implies that Tesla lost money selling cars, and that its entire gross profits came from 
selling ZEV credits. Gross profit = Revenue – Cost of Revenue, not including operating 
expenses (including R&D, general administrative, etc.). Revenue includes automotive sales, 
automotive leasing, services and other, energy generation and storage segment. Cost of 
Revenue includes all costs associated with generating Revenue. Revenue on the sale of 
regulatory credits is part of the automotive revenue (sales plus leasing). 
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 Tesla Credit Sales Activity and Value 
Notes: (a) Tesla’s annual regulatory credit sales, 2009–2019. Credit sales data for 2019 (blue bar) were not reported separately 
as ZEV vs. GHG credit. (b) The annual gross profit from credit sales in percentage and in dollars per vehicle ($/veh) (right 
vertical axis), 2012–2018. Sources: Tesla’s annual SEC Form 10-k filings and investor reports; authors’ own estimates. The 
estimates are approximate because the cutoff dates are different for sales ($ millions, January 1 to December 31) and ZEV 
credit generation (September 1 to August 31 the following year). For example, no ZEV credit sales were reported to CARB in 
2018 (September 1, 2018, to August 31, 2019) but $103.4 million was reported for January 1–December 31, 2018) to the SEC. 
Shifting the overlapping years between these data will change the annual estimates but not the overall ranges nor trends. 
2.3. US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
The national RFS program requires that a certain volume of renewable fuels replace or 
reduce petroleum-based transportation fuel, heating oil, or jet fuel. The RFS was 
created in 2005 and expanded under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, which increased the volume of renewable fuels to be blended into transportation 
fuel to 36 billion gallons by 2022. The four renewable fuel categories under the RFS 
are biomass-based diesel, cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel (biodiesel or sugarcane 
ethanol), and total renewable fuel (nonadvanced or conventional biofuel, such as corn 
ethanol). The maximum levels of life-cycle GHG emissions compared with baseline 
fuels (gasoline or diesel) are shown in Figure 5, where the height of the dots (right 
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 Shares, Price Trends, and Emissions of Renewable Fuels 
(a) Renewable identification number (RIN, or credit) generated by fuel type, 2010–2019, measured as equivalence value (EV). 
The EV of a renewable fuel represents the number of gallons that can be claimed for compliance purposes for every physical 
gallon of renewable fuel used, and it is generally the ratio of the energy content of a gallon of the fuel to a gallon of ethanol. 
Biodiesel EV = 1.5. (b) RIN prices by fuel type, 2010–2019, and maximum life-cycle GHG emissions relative to gasoline or 
diesel for each fuel category. Source: US EPA (2019). 
Obligated parties under the RFS program are refiners or importers of gasoline or 
diesel fuel. Compliance is achieved by blending renewable fuels into transportation 
fuel, or by obtaining credits to meet an EPA-specified renewable volume obligation. 
EPA calculates and establishes these obligations every year through rulemaking, 
based on the RFS volume requirements and projections of gasoline and diesel 
production for the coming year. The standards are converted into percentages, and 
obligated parties must demonstrate compliance annually. Credits are called renewable 
identification numbers (RINs). Each fuel type is assigned a D-code, which identifies the 
renewable fuel type based on the feedstock used, fuel type produced, energy inputs, 
and GHG reduction thresholds, among other requirements. The RFS program’s four 
renewable fuel standards are nested within each other. That is, a fuel with a higher 
GHG percentage reduction can be used to meet the standards for a lower GHG 
percentage reduction, but not vice versa. For example, RINs for advanced biofuel 
(biodiesel or sugarcane ethanol) can be used to meet the total renewable fuel 
standards (corn ethanol). This has important implications for the price of RINs, 
discussed below. 
RFS has created incentives for production of corn ethanol (D6) and biodiesel or 
renewable diesel (D4) (Figure 5(a)). The D6 RIN price increased dramatically, from a 
few cents in 2012 to more than $1 in 2013, when in 2013 the gasoline fuel mix hit a 
“blend wall”—the maximum amount of ethanol (10 percent, or E10) that can be 
blended into regular gasoline without causing any risk or fear of engine damage in 
conventional vehicles. After the saturation of the E10 pool when the blend wall was hit, 
any additional volume of ethanol can only be blended as E85 (85 percent ethanol). 
Because the use of E85 is limited to flexible-fuel (dual-fuel) vehicles with specialized 
engines and the sales volume of E85 is small, it was difficult to sell or blend more 
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ethanol to generate D6 RINS, causing the D6 RIN price to rise in 2013 (Burkholder 
2015). After 2013, RIN prices of corn ethanol (D6), biomass diesel (D4), and advanced 
biofuel (D5) started to converge because the nesting nature of RFS allows flexible 
compliance across fuel types, effectively lowering the RIN prices. Because cellulosic 
biofuel never materialized at scale, its RIN prices were significantly higher, but they 
dropped after 2018, when renewable natural gas (biogas) was included as a 
compliance option to be counted as cellulosic biofuel. 
2.4. Low-Carbon Fuel Standards (LCFS) 
California’s LCFS, adopted in 2010, is the first major public initiative to codify life-cycle 
concepts into law (Sperling and Yeh 2009; Yeh et al. 2016). The same policy was 
adopted by Oregon in 2016 as the Clean Fuels Program. The carbon intensity (CI) of 
fuels is measured on a life-cycle basis—that is, emissions from extraction or 
cultivation of feedstock, production, transportation, and use of the fuel are included. 
The legislation calls for at least a 10 percent reduction in life-cycle GHG emissions per 
unit of energy (gCO2e/MJ)) by 2020 and 20 percent by 2030. Oil refiners can sell low-
carbon fuels or buy credits generated by low-carbon fuel producers, such as biofuels 
producers or electric utilities that sell power to electric vehicles. 
The alternative fuels for compliance are largely biofuels from corn ethanol, biodiesel, 
and renewable diesel (Figure 6(a)) because these fuels have the lowest compliance 
costs and are compatible with existing vehicle technologies. In contrast with the RFS, 
however, LCFS allows other fuel types, including electricity, and has created strong 
incentives for fuel producers to lower the CI values. As ethanol hit the blend wall in 
2013 (Section 2.3), ethanol’s volume stayed flat (Figure 6(a)) but continued generating 
more LCFS credits (Figure 6(b)) because of higher production efficiency (e.g., more 
output per biomass, new technologies like corn oil extraction), the use of lower-carbon 
energy sources as inputs in the production processes, and a switch to biomass 
feedstock with lower carbon emissions, such as crop residues, used cooking oil, and 
wastes from food processing. As a result, the CI of ethanol and biodiesel across their 
life cycle has decreased by 33 and 41 percent, respectively (Figure 6(b), right vertical 
axis). Also shown are the volume-weighted average life-cycle CI of fuels and total 
alternative fuels in California (Figure 6(b), right vertical axis). The CI values of ethanol 
and biodiesel have drastically decreased over time (shown as arrows) while the CI of 
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 Alternative Fuel Volumes and California LCFS Credits, by Fuel Type 
Notes: “Other” includes hydrogen, renewable naphtha, and propane. Ethanol, electricity, and other fuel volumes are in gasoline 
gallon equivalent (GGE); natural gas, biomethane, biodiesel and renewable diesel are in diesel gallon equivalent (DGE). Sources: 
CARB (2020a); pers. commun., J. Witcover, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, May 23 2020. 
The price fluctuations earlier in the program were due in large part to policy 
uncertainty, including legal challenges to the program (Tracy 2010). Initially, regulated 
parties earned more credits than deficits, creating a huge surplus of banked credits, 
because compliance could be largely achieved with existing fuel technologies (Figure 
7(a)). As the standard became increasingly stringent, regulated parties started 
generating more deficits than credits and in the second half of 2017 began drawing 
down the credit bank. Also in that year, expectations firmed up regarding the 
extension of the LCFS through 2030, signaling the program’s durability and increasing 
stringency. These factors resulted in higher credit prices after 2017 (Figure 7(b)).  
 California LCFS Credits, Deficits, Sales, and Price Trends, 2011–2019 
(a) Total LCFS credits and deficits reported by year and cumulative credit bank, 2011Q1–2019Q1. Sources: Witcover (2018); 
CARB (2020a). (b) Volumes of LCFS credit transactions (left axis) and LCFS credit price (right axis), 2013–2019. Source: CARB 
(2020a). 
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2.5. Observations across Programs 
Our review of TPS programs indicates that the policies have succeeded in providing 
flexibility for compliance: companies have pursued different strategies to meet the 
standards, including selling or purchasing credits and banking. We found substantial 
amounts of early banking for some programs, since companies expected costs to 
increase as the standards became more stringent, consistent with studies suggesting 
that banking can both smooth out and lower compliance costs for companies (Rubin 
and Leiby 2013; Bialek and Shrader 2019). Program transparency varies. In RFS and 
LCFS, fuel and commodities associations publish (unofficial) weekly credit prices that 
inform their members or customers. In the CAFE and ZEV programs, companies are 
reluctant to report prices and regulators are reluctant to require reporting because it 
can reveal commercial information; however, the market is small, major players are 
visible, and in the ZEV program, direct transfer of credits between two parties is 
reported.  
The observed credit prices of TPS programs reflect the stringency level of standards 
and other factors mentioned above. Credit prices, however, are not directly 
comparable with a price on carbon implemented through an emissions fee or cap-and-
trade, or with each other, given that the primary objective of these programs is 
encouraging innovation and system transition. Viewed in terms of cost per ton of 
avoided carbon emissions (Section 4.1), observed credit prices are higher than in any 
carbon pricing program globally, but the levels are anticipated to be temporary, and 
technology benefits are expected to spill over to transportation markets in other 
countries. The programs simultaneously address other objectives, including energy 
security, local air quality, and (in the case of US ethanol) agricultural support, and they 
may yield savings due to the energy efficiency paradox. Nevertheless, given the 
importance of GHG emissions reductions, below we compare and illustrate the 
difference between TPS and carbon pricing at the conceptual level (Section 3), and 
then look at empirical studies that examine the (cost-)effectiveness of these two 
approaches individually and at the system level (Section 4). 
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3. Performance Standards versus 
Carbon Pricing 
In this section, we formalize the description of the two policy instruments to show how 
they affect the relative prices of technologies, innovation, and efficiency. This will also 
allow us to compare tradable performance standards with conventional carbon 
pricing.  
We characterize the change in relative product prices7 resulting from technology 
choice under regulation as driving market share change and providing an incentive to 
innovate. We illustrate this incentive with an example of a carbon price compared with 
a performance standard resembling the LCFS. Consider two fuels, gasoline and 
ethanol, that have respective carbon intensities above and below an emissions 
intensity standard, Cg > Cs > Ce, where 
Cs: carbon intensity standard (gCO2e/MJ)  
Cg: carbon intensity of gasoline (gCO2e/MJ)  
Ce: carbon intensity of ethanol (gCO2e/MJ) 
Eg: energy content of gasoline (MJ/liter gasoline)  
PT: tax price of carbon ($/gCO2) 
PS: intensity standard credit price ($/gCO2) 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇
𝑔𝑔: change in price of gasoline under carbon tax ($/liter gasoline)  
∆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆
𝑔𝑔: change in price of gasoline under tradable intensity standard ($/liter 
gasoline) 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒 : change in price of ethanol under carbon tax ($/liter gasoline equivalent8) 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 : change in price of ethanol under tradable intensity standard ($/liter gasoline 
equivalent) 
Below we compare the change in fuel prices under carbon pricing versus a fuel 
intensity standard. Because ethanol has less energy content than gasoline, we do all 
the accounting for ethanol in liters of gasoline equivalent. The equivalency is 
established by measuring each fuel in energy content (megajoules, MJ) rather than in 
liters or some other measure that would not be comparable. 
 
7 In the following discussion we use the term price, which is a value that could be observed in a 
market, although in some cases we might implicitly imply a cost internal to the firm. A cost 
change does not necessarily map one-for-one into a price change if standard assumptions 
about competition and information are violated. 
8 The energy content of ethanol is about two-thirds that of gasoline, 24 MJ/liter versus 34 
MJ/liter. 
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3.1. Effect of Carbon Pricing on Fuel Prices 
The effect of a carbon price, implemented as a carbon tax or through cap-and-trade, is 
to add a cost component corresponding to the carbon emissions9 (emissions 
multiplied by the carbon price level) to the fuel price.10 The emissions from ethanol are 
typically lower than emissions from gasoline, and hence the price of ethanol rises less 
than the price of gasoline. 
Under a carbon price, described henceforth as a tax, the increment to the price per 
liter of gasoline depends on the price of carbon and the total amount of carbon (we 
can view this as the intensity of the fuel relative to zero): 
 ∆P𝑇𝑇
𝑔𝑔 = 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × C𝑔𝑔 × E𝑔𝑔 (1) 
The change in the price of ethanol per liter of gasoline equivalent is also 
positive, but smaller11: 
 ∆P𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒 = 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 × C𝑒𝑒 × E𝑔𝑔 (2) 
The change in the relative prices of the fuels, given by the difference in their 
carbon intensities, provides an incentive for the use of ethanol. We call this the 
incentive margin (IM) for producing a liter of alternative fuel under a carbon 
tax. This margin is given by Equation (3):  




9 The purpose of this is to internalize the economic cost of the estimated emissions. In the cap-
and-trade example, we assume the carbon price is applied over the full life cycle, though in real 
policy applications this is not the case. The LCFS accounts for emissions across the entire life 
cycle for each fuel. These two approaches reflect the system boundaries of the two policies 
and have significant implications in terms of leakage. See DeCicco (2012) for a discussion of 
the trade-offs. 
10 Here we have assumed the conventional structure of a tax: the user pays a tax on each unit 
of emissions. This need not be the case. A different outcome would result if the policymaker 
allowed a certain amount of pollution for free and charged only for the excess pollution 
(Pezzey and Jotzo 2013). This possibility is rarely (if ever) used, but it would make the tax 
similar in some respects to a tradable intensity standard. The same result as for a tax would be 
achieved in a carbon trading scheme where allowances were distributed using output-based 
allocation of emissions allowances (Fischer 2019), a practice that is observed for a portion of 
the market in the EU, California, and Quebec trading programs.  
11 It is often the case, however, that biofuels are treated as “carbon neutral” under most cap-
and-trade programs and therefore do not pay carbon taxes. See Searchinger et al. (2009). 
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3.2. Effect of Tradable Intensity Standards 
Tradable intensity standards and taxes have different effects. A tax raises the prices 
of both fuels, but it does so more for gasoline than for ethanol. An intensity standard 
requires that fuels have an average emissions intensity of CS. Producers of fuel with 
higher emissions intensity need to buy credits, and producers of fuel with lower 
emissions intensity earn credits that can be sold. In effect, credit payments by 
gasoline serve as a production incentive for ethanol. The average price of all fuels is 
lower under an intensity standard than with revenue-raising carbon taxation because 
payments are made and received within the sector; no revenue leaves the sector to go 
to government. This is good news for motorists (and may explain why this instrument 
is often favored by policymakers). However, it also means that the incentive to 
economize on miles driven will be weaker—this is the inefficiency of the system.  
The price change for gasoline under the performance standard is given by Equation (4): 
 ∆P𝑆𝑆
𝑔𝑔 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 × (C𝑔𝑔 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) × E𝑔𝑔 (4) 
The price change for ethanol is given by Equation (5), where we see clearly that the 
price of ethanol falls because Ce < Cs: 
 ∆P𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 × (C𝑒𝑒 − 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆) × E𝑔𝑔 (5) 
We calculate the incentive margin for producing a liter of alternative fuel under a 
tradable intensity standard as the difference in prices for gasoline and ethanol: 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 × (C𝑔𝑔 − 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒) × E𝑔𝑔        (6) 
Note that IMS and IMT are of the same functional form and would actually be identical 
for the case that PS = PT. It is also interesting that CS is absent in Equation (6); that is, 
the incentive margin of the tradable intensity standard IMS is only indirectly related to 
the level of standard through the credit prices. The more stringent the intensity 
standard, the higher the credit price, and therefore the higher the incentive margin. 
We illustrate in Figure 8 that the incentive margins of the two programs IMS and IMT 
are identical when PS = PT. Under a carbon tax, however, both high-carbon fuel (dirty 
technology, DT, such as gasoline) and low-carbon fuel (clean technology, CT, such as 
ethanol) are penalized by higher prices, whereas under the tradable intensity 
standard, the low-carbon fuel receives a “reward” instead. Importantly, when PS = PT, 
the levels of changes in fuel prices (both positive and negative) are much smaller 
under an intensity standard, since the price change is only the credit price multiplied 
by the difference between the standard and the carbon intensity of the fuel (Cg – CS 
and Ce – CS ), whereas the price change under a carbon tax is the credit price 
multiplied by the full carbon intensity of the fuel or technology (Cg and Ce). 
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 Price Change of Dirty and Clean Technology under Carbon Tax and Tradable Intensity 
Standard 
Notes: Price change of two products (a dirty technology, DT, and a clean technology, CT, with equivalent energy content) 
under a carbon price (T) or credit price under an intensity standard (S), and the incentive margins of a carbon tax (IMT) vs. a 
performance standard (IMS), when: (a) for an equivalent carbon and standard price level, PT  = PS  = P; and (b) for a range of 
P = $0–$200. A negative value means a technology receives subsidies under the program, and a positive value means the 
program increases the price of a technology. For reference, the carbon price in California was around $17/tCO2e and LCFS 
credit price was around $200/tCO2e in the first half of 2020. The barely visible red line at $17 and the dashed red line at 
$200 correspond to the IMT and IMs given the observed carbon and LCFS credit prices in California. Though the figures are 
intended to be illustrative (therefore the vertical axes are not labeled), the figures are scaled realistically, using realistic 
assumptions of gasoline CI = 100 gCO2e, ethanol CI = 60 gCO2e with the standard set at 90 gCO2e (10 percent below 
gasoline CI).   
As the carbon tax and credit price go up, the change in cost also goes up linearly, and 
IMS = IMT is still the same at any equivalent carbon and credit price combination. As 
we discuss in Section 4, both programs are in fact implemented simultaneously in 
California, where the credit price and the incentive to switch from dirty to clean fuel is 
about 10 times greater under the tradable performance standard than under the 
carbon price (PS = 10×PT), but the change in the product price viewed by consumers 
attributable to each program is about equal (around 20 cents per gallon) and additive. 
3.3. Policy Guidance 
Here, we make two important observations. First, the cross subsidy expressed as IM 
(included implicitly in a carbon tax program or explicitly in a performance standard 
program) is a function solely of the carbon tax or credit price across both programs. 
Empirically, we observe that carbon tax programs tend to have lower values per ton 
carbon, and therefore weaker incentives for technology switching, than TPS programs. 
Second, because emissions pricing puts an equal value on emissions reductions 
through changes in technology or through reduced consumption of goods that embed 
emissions, it is equivalent to a coupled performance standard program and 
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consumption tax, where the credit and tax prices have a fixed relationship with each 
another. Because a performance standard focuses on producers and a consumption 
tax affects consumers, policymakers wishing to increase the effect of technology 
switching by producers could consider decoupling these two aspects of a carbon tax. 
Although any deviation away from a pure carbon tax would be less efficient 
economically, a decoupling may foster greater technology innovation by producers 
without transmitting an equivalent change in product prices to consumers. This may 
help maintain the industry’s overall market share amid international competition 
during a transition until technical, political, and societal factors allow for greater levels 
of a consumption tax.   
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4. Effects on GHG Emissions Reductions 
As emphasized previously, the most important objective of TPS is not GHG emissions 
reductions but other societal benefits—energy transition, energy efficiency, clean air, 
energy security, agricultural jobs—that lower the cost of clean(er) technology over 
time. The cost estimates also differ, depending on a static versus dynamic view of the 
program and the system-level interactions that are taken into account. For example, 
the GHG reduction from one ZEV credit depends on what vehicle the alternative 
vehicle replaces, the system-level effects of the program such as emission leakages 
and rebound, and the effects of complementary or overlapping policies (Mansur et al. 
2016). In this section, we evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual TPS programs in 
terms of the empirically observed carbon abatement cost ($/ton CO2e abated) 
(Section 4.1). We review studies that examine the effects of the programs in isolation 
(Section 4.2), the interactions of TPS programs (Section 4.3), and the effects of a TPS 
program within a cap-and-trade program (Section 4.3). 
4.1. Carbon Mitigation Costs 
Given the various policy targets, the units of TPS credits vary. For example, GHG 
regulations for vehicles have a credit price of $63/MgCO2e12, the LCFS credit price is 
around $200 per credit (tCO2e), RFS RIN credits range from $0.02 to $2.24 per RIN 
(equivalent value of biofuel gallon), and ZEV credits range from $1,000 to $7,000 per 
credit (Table 1). The GHG regulations for vehicles credit price of $63/Mg ($63/tCO2e) 
and the LCFS credit price of $200/mtCO2e can both be taken directly as the marginal 
mitigation cost of GHG abatement. At $1,000–$4,000 per ZEV credit, the marginal 
mitigation cost of ZEV is $82–$320/tCO2e.13 A RIN price of 50 cents per gallon implies 
that the mitigation cost of biodiesel is $74/tCO2e.14 These illustrative estimates are 
consistent with the static cost estimates reviewed in Gillingham and Stock (2018). 
4.2. Effects of TPS Programs in Isolation 
Several studies find that CAFE has altered manufacturers’ vehicle offerings and 
consumers’ purchase decisions (Greene 1998; Michalek et al. 2005; Fischer 2010). 
Various studies identify an emissions rebound from increased consumption because 
efficiency improvements lower the cost of travel (Ross Morrow et al. 2010), though the 
size of rebound is debated in the literature (Small and Van Dender 2007; Hymel et al. 
2010; Greene 2012; Hymel and Small 2015; Dimitropoulos et al. 2018). Nevertheless, the 
 
12 Equivalently, $63/metric ton CO2e. 
13 Assumptions: EV runs 1.6 km/MJ and an average gasoline car runs 0.5 km/MJ; electricity CI = 
200 gCO2e/MJ (California grid); a vehicle is driven 19,200 km annually for 15 years. 
14 Assumptions: biodiesel CI = 50 gCO2e/MJ at $0.96 per liter and diesel CI = 100 gCO2e/MJ at 
$0.71 per liter; energy content of diesel is 35.3 MJ/liter. Average US fuel prices are generally 
lower than in California. 
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fuel economy standards’ reduction in GHG emissions has been substantial. Greene et 
al. (2020) estimated that efficiency improvements to US light-duty vehicles reduced 
GHG emissions by 17 billion metric tons; the standards were identified as responsible 
for more than 80 percent of the improvements, and fuel prices changes, less than 20 
percent (partly because of low fuel prices in the United States). However, the new 
footprint-based vehicle GHG standard could trigger a rebound effect stemming from 
the distorted incentives toward larger vehicles for manufacturers and consumers (Ito 
and Sallee 2017). 
Similarly, studies find that the ZEV program has altered manufacturers’ ZEV 
production (Collantes and Sperling 2008; Wesseling et al. 2014, 2015; Jenn et al. 2019). 
Using data on patents, sales, and political activity, studies found that manufacturers 
also chose political strategies that evolved over time from value maintenance 
(minimize research and development, oppose the policy) to value creation (invest 
heavily in research and development to occupy the new market, proactively attempt 
to influence the policy) (Wesseling et al. 2014, 2015). 
Many studies have looked at the effects of RFS (de Gorter and Just 2010; Schnepf and 
Yacobucci 2013; NRC 2011; Farzad and Tyner 2014) and LCFS (Yeh et al. 2009; Holland 
et al. 2009; Yeh and Sperling 2010; Huang et al. 2013). The policies incentivized large 
amounts of grain-based biofuels from corn and soybean, but both fell short of 
incentivizing very low carbon biofuels, such as biofuels from cellulosic biomass or 
advanced technologies like “drop-in” biofuels. However, consistent with the LCFS 
incentives, we observe under the LCFS compliance pathways an evolution toward 
reducing the life-cycle emissions of biofuels and increasing the contribution from 
nonbio-based alternative fuels (Figure 6). The more complicated questions are the net 
GHG emissions reductions and the interactions of the two policies. Two controversies 
surround the effects GHG reductions: (1) increased fuel consumption and incomplete 
petroleum displacement due to the (global) fuel market rebound effect (Rajagopal et 
al. 2011; Hill et al. 2016), and (2) indirect land-use change due to leakage when 
increased demand for crop-based biofuels leads to cropland expansion and forest 
clearance that increase GHG emissions (Tilman et al. 2009; NRC 2011).  
4.3. Interactive Effects: Complementary, Overlapping, or 
Sequencing? 
The success of performance standards critically depends on their interaction with 
other policy packages. This interaction is complementary in addressing long-term, 
large-scale energy transitions, in several ways. For instance, a ZEV policy does not 
stand on its own in promoting clean transportation technology: other policies provide 
subsidies directly to consumers (Sen et al. 2017; Münzel et al. 2019), subsidize 
investment in charging stations (Peterson and Michalek 2013) and hydrogen refueling 
stations for electric vehicles (Ogden 1999), encourage changes to laws and 
regulations on station design and siting (among other institutional changes), inform 
potential vehicle purchasers and reduce risk aversion to new technologies, subsidize 
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R&D, and seek to lower electricity emissions. Additionally, the more successful ZEV 
and RFS are, the easier it is to achieve the LCFS because the adoption of low-carbon 
vehicles and fuels expands and enhances the compliance options. All these programs 
promote the adoption of clean vehicles and fuels, but LCFS provides additional 
incentives to lower the emissions intensity of alternative fuels.  
However, a combination of policies can also lead to undesirable consequences. For 
example, Jenn et al. (2019) simulate the interactive effect of CAFE and ZEV policies 
and find that the combined policies produce higher GHG emissions than either policy 
alone. This is because the state mandates increased ZEV-like sales (battery electric, 
plug-in hybrid, and flex-fuel vehicles) in the presence of federal incentives that relax 
the fleet GHG standard when ZEV-like vehicles are sold. Complementarity requires, 
preferably, automatic program adjustments and reviews of policy targets given 
interactions with other policies. 
4.4. TPS Programs Combined with Cap-and-Trade 
In California, cap-and-trade (CAT) is implemented alongside other regulations and 
policies to reduce overall emissions (Sperling and Nichols 2012). California’s CAT 
Phase I compliance period (effective January 1, 2013) placed a cap on GHG emissions 
associated with electricity consumption (for electricity both generated in the state 
and imported) and large industrial sources in the state, including refineries. Starting 
January 1, 2015, the CAT policy was expanded to include GHG emissions from on-road 
transportation fuels, covering gasoline, diesel, and natural gas but exempting carbon 
emissions from biofuels. The CAT and the TPS programs are designed to address 
separate challenges in achieving the state’s comprehensive climate goal. One 
challenge is the CAT’s carbon price, which is insufficiently high to achieve the kind of 
rapid technological innovation necessary for energy transformation and deep GHG 
emissions reductions in an ambitious timeline.  
The policies could also have other interactions in terms of compliance and effects on 
both regulated parties and consumers. California’s regulated parties have several 
compliance obligations (Table 1) in addition to CAT. For vehicle manufacturers and 
importers, regulations for GHG emissions from passenger cars and trucks and ZEV are 
additive (“stackable”), and meeting the ZEV program will help with meeting the 
regulations for GHG emissions, but not vice versa (Sen et al. 2017). As shown in Figure 
4, Tesla profited from selling regulatory credits, including both ZEV credits and GHG 
credits. Similarly, for fuel producers and importers, meeting the RFS will help with 
meeting the LCFS targets. Renewable fuel producers and providers will receive credits 
from both RFS and LCFS, and compliance will reduce the obligations under the CAT if 
the obligated party is a fossil fuel provider.  
As an example, Figure 9 uses realistic assumptions in California to illustrate the credit 
values per gallon for two representative fuel types, gasoline and very low carbon 
biofuel, and the additive effects of LCFS, CAT, and RFS (the example works similarly 
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for diesel fuel and its substitutes). The incentive margin of the fuel market is the sum 
of the penalties on fossil fuels plus incentives for biofuel. The additive effect remains 
large, given the rising penalties on gasoline (and diesel) despite the shrinking values 
of the incentives for biofuel over time. The combined effect is substantially greater 
than the incentive margin provided by carbon pricing from the CAT alone. For 
example, in 2020 biofuel received a net subsidy of $3.0/GGE, and gasoline incurred a 
penalty of $0.37 per gallon. Under the three programs, the net cost per average gallon 
of gasoline (E10) bought by consumers was a net subsidy of $0.1 per gallon in 2020. In 
2030 the subsidy to biofuel of the same carbon intensity falls to $2.7/GGE (assuming 
the same credit price) and the penalty on gasoline increases to $0.93 per gallon, for a 
net cost of $0.2 per gallon of blended gasoline to consumers. 
 Additive Effects of Policies in California’s Fuel Market, 2017–2030 
Notes: The effects on gasoline are shown in black (CAT) and gray (LCFS), and the effects on 
low-carbon biofuels are shown in dark green (RFS) and light green (LCFS). Positive values 
imply that a product receives credits, whereas negative values imply that a product incurs 
penalties. We use the realistic assumptions of credit prices described in Section 4: LCFS 
$200/credit, CAT carbon price from $15/tCO2e in 2017 to $50/tCO2e in 2030, cellulosic 
biofuels RIN historical values (2017–2020) and $1.8/gal after 2020. The carbon intensity of 
biofuel = 40 gCO2e/MJ. GGE means gasoline gallon equivalent. Gasoline has on average 
119.5 MJ/gallon, and ethanol = 81.5 MJ/gallon. 
Many observers argue for complementary CAT and regulatory policies in the presence 
of imperfect markets (Bird et al. 2011) or learning spillovers (Fischer and Preonas 2012; 
Lehmann 2013). For example, energy-efficient technologies, a critical component of the 
transition to sustainable energy (GEA 2012), are often hindered by the energy efficiency 
paradox, a behavioral issue. Whether consumers undervalue the future savings from 
energy efficiency improvements (termed “internalities” by Allcott et al. 2014) and if so, to 
what extent, is a subject of ongoing debate and research (Gillingham and Palmer 2014; 
Gerarden et al. 2015). If behavioral issues are prevalent, then pricing inefficiency through 
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a combination of energy efficiency incentives, along with a direct tax or shadow price 
induced by an equivalent TPS, may be a necessary component of an economically 
efficient policy solution (Allcott et al. 2014; Heutel 2015).   
The variation in marginal costs and other incentives across these policies, however, 
creates inefficiency and, inevitably, forgone opportunities for emissions reductions 
that could be remedied through carbon pricing. In the short run, technology forcing 
programs can have the effect of lowering the effectiveness of carbon pricing under 
CAT programs through the “waterbed effect” by lowering the demand for allowances, 
thereby lowering their market price and the induced incentive for innovation in the 
carbon market (Abrell and Weigt 2011; Tsao et al. 2011; Fischer and Preonas 2012; 
Nelson et al. 2015). In the California CAT program, the minimum auction price provides 
an effective price floor that converts reduced demand for allowances into a reduced 
supply of allowances and reduced emissions. In the long run, innovation-driven 
policies in the transportation sector can be viewed as a policy sequence that provides 
an on-ramp to greater stringency and efficiency through expanded carbon pricing 
(Meckling et al. 2017; Pahle et al. 2018). 
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5. Conclusions 
Tradable performance standards are technology requirements or emissions intensity 
standards that allow the trading of compliance credits across companies. Unlike 
pollution pricing, they do not fully internalize the costs of emissions and thus they 
raise the total cost of emissions reductions compared with pollution pricing. However, 
they provide incentives for upstream innovation and technology transformation that 
are greater per dollar change in product prices than carbon pricing and are generally 
additive to the effects of carbon pricing. That is, the policies can be combined without 
sacrificing the efficiency properties achieved by pricing. 
TPS policies have special appeal in the context of achieving deep decarbonization 
because of the crucial role of innovation. Reducing GHG emissions enough to limit 
global warming to 1.5° or 2.0°C requires a global transition from fossil energy. This 
transition could in principle be achieved with carbon pricing, but the complexity, 
inherent uncertainty, and systemic nature of the climate challenge would necessitate 
unrealistically high carbon prices (e.g., Rosenbloom et al. 2020). Comprehensive 
strategies addressing institutional change, network effects, tipping points, and 
behavioral issues also appear unreachable except with very high carbon prices. The 
transition will take decades, so it requires policies that will enjoy sustained public 
support. TPS policies thus present an attractive alternative, particularly in jurisdictions 
with strong resistance to fuel taxes (e.g., Heutel 2020). Moreover, the carbon pricing 
and TPS strategies are not mutually incompatible. 
Two observations provide guidance for policy: 
First, the incentive margin—whether included implicitly in a carbon tax program or 
explicitly as a cross-subsidy among technologies in a TPS program—is a function 
solely of the carbon and credit prices across both policies. We observe empirically that 
carbon pricing programs tend to have lower prices, and therefore weaker incentives 
for technology switching, than existing TPS programs. Even with explicitly high fuel 
taxes in Europe and Japan, the incentives for technology change are still insufficient. 
In California, where carbon pricing may have approximately the same effect on 
consumer prices as a TPS, the incentive margin for technology innovation under the 
TPS is 10-fold greater.  
Second, when combined with a carbon tax, TPS both achieves a high cross-subsidy to 
incentivize innovation and provides moderate output effects. TPS policies are 
intended to function as part of a comprehensive strategy to address long-term, large-
scale energy transitions. Their success therefore critically depends on the other, 
complementary policies, including carbon pricing, and care must be taken to ensure 
that overlapping policies work as intended without creating unintended 
consequences. With these conditions firmly in place, TPS policies will be, and are now, 
an important contributor to global decarbonization.  
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